Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Free will: the free will is, formulated in everyday language, the ability of a subject to choose among alternatives. See also Libet experiments, freedom, subject, individual, determinism, action autonomy, compatibilism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on Free Will - Dictionary of Arguments
V 291 Freedom of Will/Laws of Nature/violate Laws of Nature/Lewis: the fact that we apparently can violate the Laws of Nature depends on the assumption of an intermediate determinism. >Determinism/Lewis. The thesis that we sometimes willingly do what we are predetermined to do and that we might act differently in such cases, although the history and the laws of nature determine that we will not act differently. Compatibilism: thesis that the soft determinism might be true, but there may be a physical foundation for a predetermination. - E.g. I could have raised a hand. Then I would have a violated a Law of Nature. Soft determinism: this is assumed here only for the sake of the argument of soft determinism. V 292 Important argument: it does not follow, however, that there is something that is both a law of nature and broken. - For broken laws of nature are a contradiction in adjecto. >Law of nature/Lewis. V 293 The assumption here serves the differentiation of two theses: weak thesis: an actually unbroken law could have been broken. - Strong: I can break laws of nature. - Important argument: if no act of mine is a law of nature breaking event, then it could not be true that I had broken a law of nature. - ((s) not "as long as ..."). V 295 Freedom of will/break laws of nature/Lewis: E.g. Assuming I raised my hand 10 minutes ago, although it was predetermined that I should not raise it. - Then there was a time before that when the laws were broken. - Important argument: then the causation is the other way around. - The breaking of the laws caused the raising of the hand. - (See "miracle"). - But the act itself is not the miracle - therefore you do not need any supernatural powers for moderate determinism. - Problem: the effect would precede the cause. - Nevertheless, right counterfactual dependence pattern. >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis. V 296 InwagenVsLewis/Determinism, moderate. V 297 Lewis: distinction act/event. - It is the act that causes the event of breaking laws. - The act does not falsify a law but only a conjunction of history and law. >Event/Lewis._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28